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Studies in International Environmental Economics
Ingo Walter, Editor
New York: John Wiley, 1976, pp. 364.
This book contains a compendium of twelve papers and discussants' extensive evaluations presented at a Symposium on the International Economic Dimensions of Environmental Management
organized by Ingo Walter and held at New York University in April,
1975. The Symposium was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and
New York University. Since this reviewer was a participant, the review which follows will attempt to exclude examination of issues in
which he was directly involved.
The twelve papers represent a reasonable cross section of current
research into problems of international environmental management.
As Baumol notes in the introductory essay, these problems tend
naturally to coagulate around two cells. The first involves national
environmental policies that through trade effects have international
repercussions. The second is simply non-market environmental transactions among countries which share a regional or global "commons." Clearly, the first issue immerses environmental issues into the
mosaic of traditional international trade questions on non-tariff trade
barriers and tariffs, balance of trade, and other traditional comparative advantage disagreements among nations. The second appears
to evoke an entirely different panorama of issues of rights and
responsibilities and recognized interdependencies among nations due
to lack of well defined ownership rights to these "commons" and
ability to enforce them. As Baumol succinctly states the problem,
the "essential

distinguishing feature

. . .

lies in the difficulty in

achieving any sort of effective international agreement and in seeing
that it is carried out faithfully by all parties to the agreement." This
bifurcation of issues is generally represented in the volume with a
grouping of papers into three parts: (1) Trade Competitiveness; (2)
National and International Policies and Cooperation; and (3) the
Transnational Pollution Problem. In Part I Professor Grubel leads off
with an intensive examination of domestic environmental controls
within the context of the Hecksher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage. His major finding for a "small" country (no effect on terms
of trade) is that it pays the country to eliminate the internal pollution distortions "directly, leaving international trade unrestricted,
rather than introducing a new distortion of economic efficiency
through restriction on trade." The "large" country case is less clear
in terms of welfare outcomes, but Grubel's analysis tends to support
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the conclusions of earlier writers on comparative advantage: that
countries with a comparative advantage in environmental assimilative
capacity will tend toward exporting pollution intensive commodities.1 Recently, Pethig has shown this rather general conclusion
must be qualified. 2
Horst Siebert, in the next essay, develops an interesting partial
equilibrium model of interdependence between trade and environmental systems. Siebert's major conclusion is that the comparative
price advantage of a country is reduced when environmental controls
are introduced if its export sector has a relatively higher pollution
intensity; if it has a less productive abatement technology; if the
sector itself is relatively less productive; or if domestic demand cannot shift toward the pollution extensive commodity. Sieberg also
examines effluent charge equilization, "the pollute thy neighbor
thesis," possible distribution of gains from trade, and superficially,
information requirements for establishing effective trade-environmental policies. Next J. D. Davidson and John Mutti develop a very
complete empirical import-export demand model for the United
States. They examine three methods of financing domestic controls:
polluter pays, value-added tax, and a production tax; and they find
that there are striking differences in percentage reductions in output
and increases in domestic prices among individual industries but very
little difference at the aggregate level. The discussions of the papers
noted above range from a broad policy analysis by Michel Potier of
OECD, Jan Tumlir of GATT, and Edward Shykind of U.S. Commerce, to extensions of the Grubel and Siebert models by R. Pethig
and J. Dreyer.
Part II on policy dimensions contains four papers examining:
domestic control strategies and the OECD "polluter pays principle"
by Jean Phillipe Barde; commercial policy effects by H. Peter Gray;
multinational corporate strategy by Thomas N. Gladwin and John G.
Welles; and international income distribution consequences by Jaleel
Ahmad. Barde concludes that "provided environmental policies in
different countries are based on a common-cost allocation principle,
no significant trade distortion should arise." By common-cost allocation principle, Barde is referring to the adoption by nations of the
OECD polluter pays principle which provides for the polluter to pay
control costs but not to pay for damages arising after controls are
instituted. Barde states rightly that such a principle "is not a total
1. d'Arge & Kneese, Enivronnental Quality and International Trade, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1972).
2. Pethig, Pollution, Welfare, and Environmental Policy in the Theory of Comparative
Advantage, J. ENVT'L ECON. & MANAGEMENT (1976).
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internalization principle," but he then goes on to suggest that it " is
primarily an efficiency principle, but not per se an equity principle."
The OECD principle in the short run is only efficient because the
optimum level of control is selected by an autonomous agency, and
it has been demonstrated by many authors that in the long run it will
yield incorrect incentives in private economies. Alternatively, the
OECD principle defines very precisely who pays and how much.
Thus, I would suggest that the OECD principle is primarily an equity
rather than an efficiency principle. Gray, in the next essay, in fact
suggests that "OECD has adopted the polluter pays principle very
largely on the basis of its trade neutrality." Barde's paper also contains a very interesting, although intuitive, description of the problems and issues (exceptions, adjustment periods) for OECD countries
attempting practically to implement the OECD "polluter pays principle." Gray examines rather unevenly the relationship between improving domestic environmental controls and non-tariff trade barriers
and suggests that the use of commercial policies to offset the effects
of environmental controls may be necessary but must be temporary
so as not to "achieve a counter productive permanency." Gladwin
and Welles provide an in-depth survey on multinational corporation
strategies. They conclude for multinationals: (1) that environmental
behavior primarily will have to be regulated by individual states; (2)
that they are dominant "developers of technology needed for solving
industrial environmental problems;" and (3) that threats of locational shifts should not be taken seriously except for industrial
processes where pollution control costs are high. Ahmad, in the concluding essay in Part II, suggests, with little documented evidence,
that the "main ...impact on developing countries of environmental

controls in the developed countries will arise not through trade, but
through capital movements." He also suggests that it is difficult to
find supportive evidence for the conclusion by some experts in developing countries that environmental policies will widen the disparity between rich and poor nations.
Part II ends with policy statements by Judith Marquand, who
concludes that the "OECD countries as a group are not committed to
and common approach," by Howard S. MacAyeal, who concludes
that multinationals will be able to respond adequately to domestic
environmental problems, and by Jeremy Warford, who suggests that
"if one looks at the overall efficiency of the economy," since controls such as effluent charges may increase efficiency, "they will tend
to keep production costs (possibly including costs of exportables)
lower than they would otherwise be."
Part III contains four essays on the transnational dimension. The

July 1977]

BOOK REVIEWS

first essay by d'Arge reviews economic efficiency characteristics of a
selected set of policies for resolving transfrontier pollution problems
and also summarizes a case study of the stratosphere. In the second
essay, Charles Pearson examines types of oceanic pollution and the
establishment of abatement goals. He suggests that "the issue of
choosing optimum abatement levels is serious because restrictive international law is weak, the mechanisms for international transfers are
primitive, and there is no effective resort to compulsion," and finally
"mechanisms for compensatory transfers are insufficient for a priori
confidence in internationally negotiated abatement levels." Pearson
also reviews the efficiency characteristics of the Ocean Dumping
Convention. In perhaps the most interesting essay in the book,
Anthony Scott tersely examines alternative institutional approaches
for resolving transfrontier pollution issues. The five options assessed
were: diplomatic channels, trade in public goods or bads, common
agency and international property rights, and internationalization of
domestic procedures. Scott discards as unworkable or inefficient all
but the common agency and international property rights options.
Scott particularly favors the development of a common agency to
resolve .transfrontier pollution problems that will provide "the information for an initial treaty or agreement" and perhaps will issue and
regulate a market for pollution-certificates. David Pierce, in the final
essay, examines international variation in materials recycling. Empirical calcuations are made for aluminurh, copper and lead. Pierce
finds that there are substantial differences in recycling rates among
countries and that perhaps some countries are recycling too little
lead. John A. Butlin, Larry Ruff, Robert E. Stein, Stanley Johnson,
and Samprit Chatterjee provide insightful critiques of the essays in
Part 1II.
My two major criticisms of the book are its lack of identification
of important issues and points of confrontation or agreement between authors and discussants, and the rather arbitrary division of
chapters. For example, some papers in Part II could have easily been
included in Part I and vice versa. The book represents the first well
integrated and extensive examination of the state of economists'
thinking on international environmental problems. If it is relatively
uneven in quality, this can be attributed to a lack of economic research and the problems of a new field of interest and not to the
Editor's attempt to bring it all together.
RALPH C. D'ARGE*
*John F. Bugas Professor of Economics, University of Wyoming.

